

# INTELLIGENZA

PROSPETTIVE IN FILOSOFIA TEORETICA

Undicesimo incontro:

19 Maggio 2022 | h. 13:00

**TOBIAS SCHLICHT**  
(Ruhr-Universität Bochum)

*The Hard, the Easy and  
the Meta.*

*Chalmers on Problems of  
Consciousness and  
Phenomenal Intentionality*

In this talk, I focus on a change of mind in David Chalmers' thinking about consciousness and intentionality which has considerable implications for the usefulness of the Zombie-notion (and the Zombie argument) for discussions in cognitive science. I present an argument against the foundational distinction between easy and hard problems in form of a reductio, considering both Chalmers' early and later writings. The hard problem concerns subjective experience, the easy problems concern cognitive phenomena such as the ability to report and access to information that can be reductively explained by cognitive science methods. This involves discussions of his views on phenomenal concepts and judgments, as well as his later views on phenomenal intentionality which together affect the easy/hard distinction, with strong ramifications for the problem space in cognitive science. I present the argument, then justify the various premises, and finally discuss certain tentative options for Chalmers to escape the argument, showing that all of them fail.

**Link all'incontro online:**  
[meet.google.com/rxy-uoet-svs](https://meet.google.com/rxy-uoet-svs)

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